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Unal, DemirgU,-Kunt,  and Leung  investigate  the  Brady  announcement  and the Mexican  agree-
impact  of the "menu approach  to debt reschedul-  ment.  U.S. non-multinationals  do not appear  to
ing" on the market  value of two major  creditors:  have  been significantly  affected  by these intenma-
U.S. and Japanese  banks.  They try to understand  tional-debt-related  events.
how major creditor  banks are affected  by debt
reschedulings  and the menu  choices  they  make,  The reaction  experienced  by all Japanese
so that debt deals can be structured  in a way that  banks  was much  weaker  than that of U.S.
appeals  to both creditors  and debtor  countries.  multinationals  and was negative  for the Brady
&nnouncement  and the initial  Mexico  announce-
They meusure  the stock market's reaction  to  ment.  These authors  contend  that the lack of a
the announcement  of the Brady  Plan and the  strong reaction  was because  of the Japanese
Mexican  debt reduction  agreement.  The Brady  banks' relatively  low exposure  to developing
Plan was implemented  through the menu  ap-  country  risk.  They see the negative  market
proach,  which acknowledges  creditor  heteroge-  reaction  as a reflection  of the expectation  that a
neity and provides  financing  packages  that meet  U.S.-initiated  debt reduction  strategy  would  not
the country's financing  requirements  while  still  be favorable  for Japanese  banks. Indeed,  after
allowing  the banks  to reduce  their exposure.  the menu  choices  were announced,  the market
recognized  that the Japanese  banks were treated
The Mexican  agreement  provides an oppor-  fairly and corrected  itself
tunity to test the impact  of the Brady  Plan's
implementation.  By examining  individual  bank's  They do not find that banks that made
menu choices,  exposure  levels,  and the market's  different  choices  were treated  differently  by the
reaction,  they explore  whether  banks were able  market, so banks were able to negotiate  menu
to make optimal  portfolio  choices  when con-  choices  in their best interest and to make portfo-
fronted  with the obligation  to participate.  lio choices  consistent  with their business  objec-
tives.
They show that stock prices  for different
groups  of banks reacted  quite differently  to focal  The results here  confirm  that the menu
events.  Among  all banks, U.S. multinationals  approach  to debt restructuring  may benefit  both
showed  the strongest  positive  reaction  to the  the creditor  banks and the debtor  countries.
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L Introduction
Previous research documents  a significant  negative impact of  the international debt-crisis that
was triggered by the Mexican debt moratorium of 1982 on the creditor banks in the U.S.'  Studies
that examine the effects of various proposals undertaken to ease the burden on U.S. creditor banks
report significant positive security returns  for these institutions.  Three measures were subject to
empirical investigation: The passage of the International Lending Supervision Act and the increase
in the U.S. quota in the IMF in  1983, Federal Reserve's (Fed) amendment to Regulation K which
allows creditor banks to make debt-equity swaps, and increases in loan loss reserves. 2 However,  none
of these measures affected the debt servicing capacity of the debtor countries. Hence, they lacked the
ability to affect the risks the creditor banks face on their outstanding loans to developing  countries.
The Brady Plan of 1989  is a significant exception.  In his address to the Brookings Institution
and the Bretton Woods  Committee Conference  on  Third World  debt on March 10, 1989,  U.S. Secretary
of the Treasury Nicholas  Brady supported debt and debt-service  reduction in addition to rescheduling
of principal and extending new-money  packages. The plan proposes the IMF and the World Bank
allocate resources to encourage the  reduction of debt burdens  and  interest  payments by debtor
countries. Funds obtained from these organizations will be used to enhance the creditworthiness of
securities to be exchanged for commercial  banks' existing loans.
A menu approach, which involves a two-step process, was adopted to implement the Brady
Plan. First, a steering committee representing the creditor banks and the debtor country negotiated
the contents of the menu to be offered  to the creditor banks. Negotiations focused on the amount of
discount to be applied to existing debt, and availability of new-money  facilities.  Once the menu was
1Schoder  and Vankudre  (1986),  Cornell  andShapin  (1986),  Sachs  and Huizinga  (1987),  Bruner andSimms (1987),  Smirlock
and Kaufold  (1987).  Musumeci  and Sinkey  (1990a),  and Ozler  (1990)  focus  on the market's reaction  to the development  of the
debt crisis.
2  Cornell, Landsman and Shapiro (1986),  Blllingeley  and Lamy (1988),  Eysell, Fraser and Rangan (1989),  Madura and
McDaniel  (1989),  Grammatikos and Saunders  (1990),  and Musumeci  and Sinkcey  (1990b)  study the impact of these measures
on bank security returns.approved and  an  initial  accord was signed by both  parties  the  next  step  constituted  obtaining
subscriptions from individual banks to the choices  outlined in the menu. The creditor banks have the
"obligation"  to exchange their outstanding developing-country-debt  with bonds at a discount or to lend
new money or both.  The banks effectively  "forgive"  a portion of the foreign debt if they choose not to
give new money. However,  in return, they receive  bonds that are less risky than the country-debt since
principal and interest payments would  be secured by U.S. Treasury bonds. Funds required to purchase
U.S. Treasury bonds come from international organizations.
This approach is a significant digression from concerted  new-money  packages or reschedulings
where creditors negotiate with the debtor countries in syndicates and preserve the equal rankings of
their  claims. The menu  approach  acknowledges creditor heterogeneity,  and  provides  financing
packages that meet the country's financing requirements while still allowing  the banks to reduce their
exposure. The banks benefit because the lower debt burden for the debtor country has the potential
to reduce the risks faced by creditor banks.
Mexico  became the first country to sign a landmark debt package under the framevwork  of the
Brady initiative. Over 500 banks worldwide  negotiated the terms of a menu to exchange their Mexican
loans with enhanced bonds or increase their exposure to Mexico  (by lending new money). 3 The deal
covered  about $48.9 billion of medium-term and long-term commercial  bank debt. The banks had the
option of providing  new money  equal to 25 percent of their exposure or convert their outstanding debt
to bonds with either a reduced face value and market-based interest rate or the same face value but
a reduced and fixed interest rate.
This paper's objective is to measure the stock market's reaction to the announcement of the
Brady  plan  and  the  Mexican debt-reduction agreement.  The  market's  reaction  to  the  Brady
announcement shows the expected effects  of the "debt-forgiveness"  plan on banks' profitability. On the
other hand, Mexican agreement provides an opportunity to test the effect of the implementation of the
Brady plan. Specifically,  by examining individual banks' menu choices,  exposure levels and market's
3 Following  the Mexico  agreement, Philippines,  Costa  Rica,  Venezuela  and Uruguay signed debt-reduction  packages  with
their creditor banks in 1990.  Brazil, Argentina, Poland, Ecuador and Nigeria are in the process o! aegotiating debt-reduction
packages  with their creditor banks.3
reaction we can learn  more about bankd'Yrisky  asset,-choice decisions when confronted with the
obligation to participate.
Our sample consists of U.S. and Japanese banks. We include Japanese banks to evaluate the
differential effects of the events on a cross-country  basis. Also,  we examine the effect of a U.S. initiated
debt-reduction strategy on Japanese banks because the menu choices  offered  to the creditor banks may
have served U.S. bank interests best at the expense of Japanese and other banks.4
The paper is planned as follows:  Section II provides a  brief explanation of the Mexican
financing package. Section III identifies  event dates and data sources. Section IV develops  hypotheses
and explains the test design. Section V and VI present our findings for U.S. and Japanese banks,
respectively. We conclude in Section VII.
IL.  An Example  of a Menu Deal: The 1989 Mexican Financing  Package.
The agreement between Mexico and the advisory committee announced on July  23, 1989
proposed three  options to creditor banks.  First, banks could swap their existing loans for 30-year
Debt-Reduction  Bonds (DRBs)  at a discount to face value of 35 percent. These discount bonds carry
an interest margin of 13116  percentage point over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).  The
second option banks had was to swap their existing loans with 30-year Debt-Service  Reduction Bonds
(DSRBs)  with the same face value. These par bonds carry a below-market fixed interest rate of 6.25
percent. DRBs and DSRBs are also called "exit instruments." The final option banks had  was to
provide new loans over a four-year period equivalent to 25 percent of each bank's 1989 exposure, net
of loans exchanged with the exit instruments. The new loans carry market rates and had an interest
margin of 13/16 point over LIBOR. Given these three menu choices a creditor bank could set its new
exposure level to  Mexico within the  range between 65 percent  and  125 percent  of its  previous
exposure.
The creditworthiness of exit bonds was enhanced by $5.6 billion of funds from the IMF, the
4 For example,  the steering  committee, which negotiated  the Mexican menu choices, was headed  by Citicorp and the US.
banks  constituted  the majority.4
World Bank, and the Japanese Export-Import Bank. Mexico  contributed $1.6 billion for enhancement
of the new instr  .dnts. This  total $7.2 billion "official  money"  was used to purchase zero-ccupon  U.S.
Treasury bonds to be pledged against the principal of both exit bonds and  18 months of interest
payments on a rolling basis through an escrow account. During the fi st week in January,  1990 the
U.S. Treasury issued 30-year zero-coupon  bonds at an effective  interest-rate  of 7.925  percent.' Finally,
on January  10, 1990 the Mexican finance ministry announced that banks accounting for 49 percent
of the loans chose DRBs, 41 percent chose DSRBs  and about 10 percent agreed to provide new money.
On March 28, 1990  Mexican government issued $22.5 billion DSRBs,  and $11.6 billion DRBs. The new
money totalled $1.25 billion to be disbursed over the 1990-1992  period. The new loans carried no
guarantees.
U.S. banks exchanged 58 percent of their outstanding debt for par bonds and 24 percent of
their debt with discount bonds. The remainder of  the outstanding debt constituted the base for the new
money contributions. Japanese  banks overwhelmingly  chose the discount bands and contributed no
new money to the pack. They exchanged 18 percent of the existing exposure for par bonds and 81
percent for discount bonds. In an extensive report on recent debt-reduction agreements, Hay and Paul
(1991) identify four major factors affecting the bank choices:  (1) individual bank's expectations with
respect to interest rates and currency values, (2) percepticns of underlying credit risk, (3) long-term
business objectives and  (4) regulatory and tax policy environment of the  creditor bank's country.
Interestingly, Hay and Paul conclude that "the decision of banks to participate in financing packages
does not appear to have been significantly influenced  by tax and regulatory policy."
m.  Event  Dates  and  Data
U.S Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady made his speech on March 10, 1989 (Friday)
which was covered  in the business press on March 13. President Bush and Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan announced their support for the plan on March 15 and 17, respectively. Hence, we
define our first event date as follows:
The Treasury  coupon  issues  traded  at about  8.05  percent  on January  8, 1990.5
Event  1  - The  week  ending  March  17,  1989: Since the  plan  created  considerable debate
in the press during the week following  the announcement, we focus on bank stock returns
during the week ending March 17, 1989 to capture the X. pact of the Brady announcement.
The second focal event is the Mexican agreement. The conclusion of the negotiations of the
Mexico  agreement took roughly one year and numerous obstacles  had to be resolved. 6 First, consistent
with the Brady plan, on March 30, 1989  Mexico  proposed creditor banks to either provide it with new
loans or reduce its debt in exchange for more creditworthy securities. This proposal effectively  started
the negotiations and confirmed that Mexico's  debt-reduction agreement would be the first test-case of
the Brady Plan. Second, the IMF and the World  Bank announced the details of this support to Mexico
for debt reduction purposes. Next, Mexico  negotiated the menu choices  to be offered  to creditor banks
such as the discount to be applicable to the Mexico  debt, the interest-rate,  and the amount of new
money, with a 15-member  bank advisory committee  representing more than 500 commercial  creditor
banks. On July 23, 1989 (Sunday) the agreement on the menu choices  was announced. Following  this
initial accord, Mexican  government carried out negotiations with the individual banks to obtain their
subscription to one of (or a combination of) the choices.
Given this  process we focus on the following dates to measure  the impact of the Mexico
agreement on bank stockholders' wealth:
Event  2 - March 30, 1989: We analyze bank stock returns on this date to measure the market's
reaction to the beginning of negotiations between Mexico  and creditor banks.
Event  3  July  24, 1989: The market's reaction on this date may reflect the impact of the initial
accord signed between Mexico  and creditor banks. On this date the three menu choices
to be offered to the creditor banks were announced.
We conduct our analysis using a sample of twenty U.S. and twenty-one Japanese banks that
signed agreements with Mexico. Daily returns  for each sample U.S. bank and the NYSE and AMEX
6To  identiJi news  items pertaining to the development  of the Mexican  agreement  we searched  relevant sections  of the Wall
Street Journal Index, Fnancial lTmes  and American Banker for 1989.  A chronology  of all news items that appeared in these
sources  is available bom the authors upon request.6
Composite  Index are obtained from the tapes constructed by the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) at the University of Chicago.  For Japanese banks and the NIKKEI 500 index we could only
obtain weekly returns from Nihon Keizai Shimbun America, Inc. The names of the U.S. and Japanese
banks together with their exposure and option choices in the Mexican agreement are given in Table
I. Option choice information is obtained from Citicorp. Developing country exposure information for
U.S. and Japanese  banks are obtained from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, (from the
Freedom of Information Office),  and International Bank Credit Analysis (IBCA),  respectively.
IV. Hypotheses  and  Test  Design
The Brady Plan  and the subsequent debt-reduction agreements are often criticized on the
grounds that  the U.S. banks were forced  into making sub-optimal decisions.  A vivid example o( such
claims is a lead article bv columnist Richard X Bove of the American Banker where he argues that
Treasury Secretary  Nicholas Brady's debt reduction plan had  a damaging impact on U.S. banks
because they are forced to forgive  a large portion of the debt-service payments. He writes "..because
the U.S. government, in essence, cut a pact with the Latin American billionaires, on debt forgiveness,
50,000 United States bank employees  lost their jobs." 7
Exchanging one asset for another can effect bank value, if the new asset's market value is
different than that of the original one. It can be argued that banks had the opportunity to have value-
increasing swaps. First, the Brady plan proposes the use of official  money to guarantee principal and
interest payments on new bonds. Second, the new instruments (bonds as opposed  to syndicated loans)
may have lower credit risk. Since  bonds are bearer instruments, the creditors are no longer necessarily
a known group of banks. Anyone,  including the debtor country institutions may end up holding them.
This makes it difficult for the debtor country to seek rescheduling, increasing default costs. Also, the
lower burden on the debtor country could reduce the risk- faced by creditor banks on the remaining
outstanding debt. Finally, the menu-choice  allows banks to reshuffle their loan portfolio,  to reduce or
increase their  exposure to developing countries based on their own individual risk perceptions. In
7 American  Banker  March  31, 1992, p. 6:7
addition, instruments can be tailored (through the menu approach) to suit the preferences of different
groups of banks that operate under different regulatory and tax regimes. This fle;Jbility may create
added value.
To identify the stock market's evaluation of the impact of the Brady plan on bank profitability,
we  examine stock  returns  on  our  event  dates.  Consistent with  the  event-study  literature  on
international  debt crisis, we first  test the new-information hypothesis.  The premise is that  in an
efficient market new information is quickly reflected in security prices.  U.S. banks are classified as
being multinational (money center) or non-multinational banks. This classification has the advantage
to observe differences between these two groups. Sinkey and Greenwalt (1991) provide evidence  that
loan-loss experience and risk taking behavior between "money  center" banks and regional banks are
di.fferent.  Our list of  multinational banks is the same as the list of money-center  banks given in Sinkey
and Greenwalt (1991). In addition, Schoder and Vankudre (1986) argue that  this  classification is
superior to exposure level information to explain the stock price response of exposed banks. Table I
shows that the average LDC Iebt-exposure  of multinational banks is 163 percent of their book values.
In contrast, this exposure ratio is 56 percent for the non-multinational group.
We use the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)  approach to calculate abnormal returns for
each bank, as in Smirlock and Kaufold (1987).  In this method each bank stock's returns are time series
stacked  and  system  of equations  are  estimated  simultaneously  to  allow for  contemporaneous
correlation  among banks.  The following system  is  estimated  for  the  multinational  and  non-
multinational bank groups separately using observations from the indicated sample periods:
Rlt  =  ali +  iRmt  +ylDt  +  eOlt
R2 c  =  a2  +  f3 2RMe +y2De  + e2c t  (1)
Rnt  an  +  O 3nRrt  +.';.  De  + ene 
where R, is the stock return of bank i on day t, R,  , is the return on the market index on day t, and
D, is a dummy variable equal to one on the event day and zero otherwise. The event term %D,  would8
measure the price response (abnormal return) of bank stocks to the specified events.
The following  hypothesis is tested for each of our three events using both multinational and
non-multinational banks to examine the magnitude and significance  of the information contents of the
events:
BYPOTHESIS I (HI): The abnormal -..turn on the event day for each  sample bank equals zero.
(Y,q,§=  . . . n,  - 0).
A related hypothesis is whether the price response is uniform across all sample banks. This
is important because otherwise it can be argued that  the market failed to distinguiah among banks.
Hence, the following  null hypothesis is evaluated.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (H2):  The abnormal returns on the event day art  equal across all sample
banks (,v-y 2 =  . . y.
If Hi  is rejected, the next layer of tests focus on explaining the cross-sectional variation in
abnormal returns.  The issue is whether or not the market participants  rewarded or penalized the
banks in proportion to a firm-specific  variable. Bruner and Simms (1987)  describe this as the rational-
pricing hypothesis which implies that the market was able to distinguish among the exposure levels
of different banks and the response is proportional to exposure. An alte.native hypothesis focuses on
investor-contagion.  Under this hypothesis, when the market responds to a common event like the
Brady plan, it evaluates the impact without regard for the extent of  individual banks' exposure levels.
Hence, the response is not proportional across banks.
To test whether or not differences  in abnormal returns are proportional to developing  country
debt exposure, the following  system is estimated:
RX, n  aX  IR  FlD,Xl  e
R2t a 2 + z4.t  +4) 4 2  + eDt  6  (2)
R  =  a,  + PJIR,  +A,D,EX,,  + et  .
where A,  measures the exposure price-response relation and EXi is the LDC debt exposure of bank i9
calculated as book value of foreign loans as a percentage of book value of equity at the end of 1988.8
As in Smirlock and Kaiufold  (1987) we test the following  hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS  3 (NU: The  price-r:jponse  parameters  are equal  across  all banks
. XIA.,a,  * . =  A,).
The price response parameter  (O) equals the abnormal return  for a bank  deflated by the
exposure level. The test  of equality of (1) across all banks (XA=X2=  ...  =,)  provides a test of the
rational pricing hypothesis. If Xs  are equal across banks, the abnormal returns vary across banks as
a constant proportion of individual bank's exposure level.  Whether or not the market has appLied  the
same multiplier (the price) to the exposure level of each individual bank reflects the impact of the
event.
Rejecting the null may pose problems. In the literature, this evidence is taken to support the
investor-contagion hypothesis. However, rejecting proportionality in pricing may also be consistent
with heterogenous-creditor  hypothesis. James  (i990) provides evidence to  show that  the value of
developing country loans varies among commercial banks. He argues that  the value of a loan to a
particular country depends on the identity of the lender for three reasons. In debt restructuring some
creditors may not be able to avoid  forced  lending.  Also,  ability to impose sanctions and bargaining with
the developing country may differ across lenders. Finally, the government subsidies due to these loans
may differ across banks.  Hence,  James' heterogenous-creditor  bypothesis implies that price response
may not be proportional to exposure. The market participants may very well be applying different
multipliers (prices) to individual bank's exposure levels because the event in question may have a
differential effect on the value of the loan portfolio.
Smirlock and  Kaufold (1987) tests  the rational-pricing hypothesis as  a restriction on the
system of equations given in (2). However, the equality of the price-response parameters (Xs)  is also
tested using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimate of the relation between abnormal returns  and
a We calculate EX, using exposure of bank i to Mexico  when we anaLyze  the announcements relating to the Mexico
agreement.10
exposure levels.' 'The equation estimated is:
A  = c + dEX + e.  (3)
A significant correlation between abnormal returns  and exposure is taken to constitute evidence for
rational-pricing.
This test is different than the design given in the SUR framework. In testing rational pricing
using the SUR approach the researcher allows  proportionality to be different for each bank. Deviation
from proportionality can be due to for a number of possibilities.  In contrast,  when OLS is used,
deviation from proportionality is restricted by the model specification.  If there exists some covariance
between abnormal returns and exposure levels we may obtain significant  d, which may not imply that
the constant applied to each bank is equal across banks.  In OLS, the multiplier to be applied to
exposure levels across banks (the slope coefficient)  is by definition constant across observations. Then,
given this assumption of constant pricing across banks, the investigation becomes  whether or not high
exposed banks show larger abnormal returns.  Hence,  this approach does not test proportionality in
pricing and is not a direct test of rational pricing.'° One can simply obtain significance by having a
sample composed  of one group of banks (such as multinationals) which react more to international
events and another group (such as non-multinational banks) which show less reaction to such events.
V. Results  for  U.S. Banks
Our focal events occur in  1989. To put  our specific events into broad  perspective, it  is
instructive to consider a partial chronology  of information events that might have proved relevant in
1989. In January,  1989, Federal reserve issued final guidelines to implement its risk-based capital
requirements, which were in accordance  with the guidelines established by the Basle Accord of 1988
requiring banks of twelve industrial  countries to maintain a minimum capital to assets ratio of 8
percent." Dealing with the move toward tougher capital standards  was a major issue for U.S banks
9 Cornell  and Shapiro (1986),  Bmner and Simms (1987)  and Musumeci  and Sinkey (1990a)  are examples.
10 It is possible  that the conclusions  of  the studies using equation  3 to test for  rational pricing could  be reversed if they had
tested the hypothesis  within the SUR framework.
11  Eyssell and Arshadi (1990)  examine  the wealth effects  of the Basle Accord.11
as well as Japanese banks throughout the 1989. The Brady announcement and Mexican agreement
were the  highlights  of the  second quarter  of 1989. In  August, Congress passed  the  Financial
Institutions Reform and Recovery  Act and the third quarter also witnessed the emergence of the real
estate problems for the banking industry.
These developments might jointly or individually have, supported revised expectations large
enough to induce a shift in the return-generating processes for deposit-institution stocks. Hence, we
start  our analysis by a  specification check to test for parameter  stability in our assumed return
generating process, the market  model, during 1989. Our objective is to identify regimes where the
sensitivity of individual asset's retums to market returns  (the beta coefficient)  remain constant.  We
focus on two equally weighted portfolios  constructed from multinational and non-multinational banks.
Using Goldfeld  and Quandt's switching  regressions method (GQSRM),  we find that the multinational
portfolio's  beta followed  three regimes." 2 The switch from the first regime to the second occurred on
April 7, 1989. The second switch is  observed on November 22, 1989. For the non-multinational
portfolio,  we could uncover only one switch which is observed on November 27, 1989.
Our next step is to measure abnormal returns in the vicinity of the focal dates. To control for
beta shifts in  the estimation of abnormal returns  we use sub-periods identified by the GQSRM.
Events 1 and 2 fall within the first regime identified by the switching-regression. Hence, for the
multinational banks we use a 70-day sample period covering December 28, 1988 to the start  of the
second regime (April 7, 1989)  to test for stock price response to these events. For event 3, we use a
160-day sample period covering  April 7, 1989  through the end of second regime (November  22, 1989).
Since the non-multinational banks' only switch comes  after the focal events, we use a 232-day sample
period covering December 28, 1989 through November 26, 1989 (the switch date), to estimate the
abnormal return for all three events." 3
12 Kane and Unal (1988) and Unal (1989) provide extensive description of the method and its application to event studies.'
is We replicated  our estimates  of abnorrnal returns  for both group of banks using the full sample period of 1989. The results
qualitatively  remain unchanged. However, when we allow for beta changes our estimates  of abnormal returns  gain slightly more
significance. Estimates  of abnormal return  where full 1989 observations  are used (ignoring switches identified by the Goldfeld
and Quandt  method) are available  from the authors.12
The Brady  Announcement: Table II, Panel A reports estimates of Equation 1 and related hypotheses
tests for the multinational banks during the Brady announcement. Although the announcement is
made on March 10, Table IV shows that we do not observe any significant market  reaction before
March 16 and 17 when the President's and Fed Chairman's support for the plan were announced. In
other words, the market needed further official  endorsement for the plan.
The coefficient  y, which captures the effect  of the announcement, is positive and significant for
all multinational banks over these two days. The cross-sectional mean of y is 3.21 for March 16 and
3.67 for March 17 which suggests that an equally weighted portfolio of these bank stocks would have
earned a 6.88 percent return over these two days. Both Hi and H2 are rejected indicating that Brady
announcement caused multinational banks to experience a significant positive return and that this
gain was not uniform across banks.
In contrast,  Panel  B shows that  the  event parameter  y is not  significant for 9 out of 10
non-multinational banks on March 16 and none of them shows significance on March i7.  Hence, we
fail to reject HI indicating that the Brady announcement had no impact on non-multinational banks.
This is consistent with the argument that multinationals, due to the nature of their business,
are simply more sensitive to events with international repercussions. Also, despite the criticisms of
the Brady plan we observe that the market participants treated the announcement as "good  news",
and one that can increase the profitability of the U.S. multinational banks.
We follow  Smirlock and Kaufold (1987)  and do a joint F-test of whether Xs in equation 2 are
jointly equal to one another. The last two columns in Panel A of Table IV provide estimates of X.
Hypothesis 3 is rejected for both dates indicating that  the price response is  not proportional to
exposure."' We also combined the multinational and non-multinational banks and estimated Xs and
tested for equality. We again rejected the null.'6
Before we rush and conclude that the results support the investor-contagion hypothesis we
14  Alternatively,  we regressed abnormal  returns on the exposure  variable and obtained a significant  positive  relationship.
However,  as indicated above  this approach does not constitute a test of rational pricing.
15  Results can be obtained from the authors upon request.13
allow for the heterogeneity among creditors.  We estimate the following equation (t-values are in
parentheses):
ARV/EXY  =  .069  - .023EX  R2= 0.77
(9.0)  (-5.4)
The  slope coefficient is  significant and  negative implying that  banks  with  low exposures have
benefitted disproportionately to their exposure, i.e., they benefitted more than their  more-exposed
counterparts,  which is possible if the more exposed banks are not getting the  full benefit of the
announcement, or alternatively,  this  full benefit is  being offset by a  'loss" caused by improved
conditions generated by the Brady announcement. This observation is consistent with the argument
that  the highly exposed banks, which can be considered as "too-big-to-fail"  banks, do not benefit as
much from the Brady plan because they lose some deposit-insurance subsidy provided by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  The higher the subsidy a bank gets the less is the response to
"good"  news. Hence, banks that are not exposed as much, do not have much insurance subsidy to lose,
they get the full benefit. In other words, the market is rationally pricing the impact, however, the
overly exposed banks have something to lose when conditions improve in addition to gains created
by the announcement"  Hence, rejecting the null is consistent with government subsidy aspect of the
heterogenous-creditor hypothesis.
The Mexico Agreement:  Table III shows the findings on our events 2 and 3. Estimates of beta
coefficients  for the period April 7, 1989 to November 22, 1989 are given in column 3 of Panel A.
For our event 2 (March 30), when Mexico  announced its plans to start negotiations with creditor banks
in accordance  with Brady guidelines, we observe  significant and positive reaction from the market. The
market's reaction, however, was abrupt and the response was without any delay.  Hypotheses 1 and
2 are rejected indicating that abnormal returns on this day for each bank jointly are not equal to zero
and are not equal across all multinational banks. The average portfolio return  on this  day is 3.4
percent. We observe no significant reaction from the non-multinational group and fail to reject Hi and
1 Demirguc-Kunt  and Huizinga  (forthcoming)  also provide  consistent evidence.14
H2.
It is interesting to note that at the time of this announcement the enhancement money for the
discount bonds was not secured from the IMF and the World Bank. Furthermore, the menu choices
were not agreed upon either. The positive reaction of the market participants reflects their optimistic
expectation of the outcome of the negotiations.
Our third focal event is the announcement of the initial agreement between Mexico  and the
steering committee on July 24.  We fail to reject H1 for both multinational  and non-multinational
banks implying that abnormal returns among banks are not significantly different from zero. In other
words, market  did not show any significant reaction to the announcement of the menu choices  to be
offered to the creditor banks.  This finding shows that  the gains from the Mexico.  agreement were
reflected in bank stock prices when negotiations started. The announcement of the agreement did not
cause the market participants to revise their expectations.
Our next layer of tests focus on whether or not the market  was able to differentiate banks
according to their exposure levels or the choices  they made to exchange their Mexican debt. First, we
estimated  equation  2 by using Mexico-debt  exposure as  EX; and  tested  for equality of X across
multinational banks for the second  event. Similar to the case in the Brady plan, we reject the equality
of A  across multinationals implying that the response was not proportional to exposure levels.
Next, we test whether or not the market participants  could predict bank choices and react
differently toward banks choosing  new instruments or providing  new money.  We  re-estimated equation
1 and tested for equality in average abnormal returns among banks which did not choose DRBs  (banks
1, 6 and 7), Citicorp (which provided  the majority of the new money)  and the rest of the multinationals
which chose a combination of DSRBs and DRBs. We fail to reject the equality among these three
groups for events 2 and  3.1?  We firther  examined differences among multinational banks which
provided new money as a group (banks 1, 5, 6 and 8) and those that did not. We again failed to reject
17  The F-statistics are 0.63 and 0.15  for events  2 and 3, respectively.15
the equality of average abnormal returns  among these two groups. 18
Analysis of Citicorp's abnormal returns is also instructive. Table 1 shows that Citicorp leads
our sample banks in terms  of exposure to Mexico.  Also, it is the only bank  which increased its
exposure to the maximum possible (125 percent of the previous exposure) by choosing the new money
option.  This behavior is consistent with Citicorp's  long-term business objectives  in Mexico. 19 Abnormal
returns for Citicorp reflect that market participants approved this choice. Hence, our results support
the hypothesis that creditor banks made the optimal choices that were consistent with their business
objectives.
VL Results  For Japanese  Banks
Table I also provides exposure and choice information for our sample Japanese banks. It is
customary to  classify these  banks  as  Long-Term Credit  Banks,  Trust  Banks  and  City Banks.
Traditionally, the first two groups of banks specialize in providing long-term credit whereas City
Banks provide short-term loans (Kane, Unal and Demirguc-Kunt, 1991). The average LDC  exposure-
to-book value ratio for each of these groups are considerably less than the average for U.S. non-
multinational group. When the exposure is measured as a percentage of the market value of equity,
the Japanese  bank  groups' average ratio ranges between 5 to  7 percent  as  opposed to  the U.S.
multinational and non-multinational ratios of 318.84 percent and 76.39 percent.
Among the three Japanese  bank groups, Long-Term Credit Banks and Bank of Tokyo are
perceived to be the major banks involved in LDC lending. Trust Banks' access to foreign markets is
controlled by the Ministry of Finance. Bank of Tokyo  (which is a city bank) has the largest overseas
representation and the majority of its earnings come  from abroad (Mullineux, 1987).  These features
are also evident from Table I, where Bank of Tokyo  is the bank with the highest exposure followed  by
Long-Term Credit Banks.
8 The F-statistics are 0.73 and 0.51 for events 2 and 3, respectively.
19 Citicorp  is the only sample bank that has an extensive  branchl  hetwork in Mexico.  Also, as we will see below,  Japanese
banks greatly shied away from extending new money  to Mexico,  but all chose to give new money in the Philippines debt-
reduction agreement.16
We constructed three equally weighted portfolios  representing each group of Japanese banks
and one portfolio  of all sample Japanese banks to test for structural  shifts in the market model. Due
to data availability weekly observations are used instead of daily observations. GQSRM  results show
that the return generating process of Japanese banks as proxied by the market model did not exhibit
any significant shift in 1989.
Brady Announcement:  Table IV reports estimates of the system of equations given in equation 1
for 21 Japanese  banks.  We use weekly observations and  name the weeks containing our focal
announcements as the "event weeks." None of the Japanese banks show a significant reaction on the
week ending March 17, and only 5 out of 21 banks show a significant negative reaction on the week
ending March 24. While as a group Long-Term Credit Banks and Trust Banks show 3 percent and 6
percent negative abnormal returns,  Bank of Tokyo stock does not exhibit any material reaction.'
The lack of a  strong reaction (relative to U.S. multinationals) may be due to two reasons.
First, using weekly rather  than daily returns  may be blurring the results. 21 Second, and perhaps
more importantly, their  relatively low LDC exposure accounts for the weak reaction.  The overall
negative reaction we observe (although only significant for 5 banks) may be attributed to the general
perception at the time that Japanese banks had to bear a disproportionate share of the developing
country debt burden due to the large trade surplus of Japan. Since both Long-Term Credit Banks and
Trust  Banks  are  involved in  long-term credit  and  international  lending, and  the  international
activities of Trust Banks are highly influenced by the Ministry of Finance, these two groups of banks
may have been perceived to be the best candidates to shoulder the new burden. Hence, both of these
two groups exhibit the largest losses.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are rejected implying that  when abnormal returns  are examined cross-
sectionally some banks exhibited abnormal retums  significantly different than zero, and that these
20  We  reoesmated  equation  1 in two  other  ways.  Flint  we  stacked  all US. banks  and  Japanese  bank.,  then  only  US.
multinational  banks  and  Japanese  banks.  In both  cases  our  findings  do not  change  and are similar  to  those  given  in Table  IV.
21  We  rerun all previous  tests for  US. banks  using  weekly  returns  for  U.S.  banks. Our conclusions  for  U.S.  banks  are
unchanged  when  weekly  retuns  are used.  Results  are available  ftom  the authors.17
abnormal returns  are not equal among  Japanese banks. When equation 2 is estimated, the exposure-
adjusted coefficients (Xs)  also show similar results. The equality of ;'s  across banks is rejected for
Japanese  banks  as well.  This implies that  factors other than  simple exposure information were
instrumental  for the market participants to evaluate the impact of the Brady announcement.
The Mexico Agreement:  Japanese banks' reaction to the Mexico  agreement is again quite different
than what we observe for U.S. multinational banks.  As in the case of Brady announcement, market
reaction to announcements relating to the Mexico  agreement are not very strong. For the week ending
March 31, when Mexico  announced its plans to start negotiations with creditor banks, Japanese banks
show a negative reaction in general (significant  for only 3 banks). This indicates that the market still
anticipated that the Brady Plan or agreements negotiated under this U.S. initiated plan would affect
the Japanese  banks  adversely. In other words, the  market  participants  may have expected that
Japanese  banks may be coerced into signing an agreement that  was not necessarily in their best
interests.
However, results  for the week ending July  28 show the  market's  reevaluation.  Indeed,
Japanese banks experience an overall positive reaction (significant for 2 banks) at this date.  These
observations are consistent with the argument that  the announcement of the menu choices did not
disadvantage the Japanese banks, at least not to the extent anticipated by the market earlier in the
negotiations. This resulted in a positive adjustment by the market participants.  U.S. banks, however,
showed no reaction at this point.
To test whether or not bank choices  could  be predicted and reflected in prices, we formed two
groups from Japanese banks. The first group consisted of banks that chose no DSRBs  and the second
group contained the  rest  excluding Daiwa Bank (the only Japanese  bank that  chose to give new
money).  We could not reject equality of these two groups for both weeks.'  Again, we do not have any
evidence that  bank choices were priced differentially by the market participants.
22 The F-values for the weeks ending April 2 and July 30 are 0.01 and  0.01, respectively.18
V1i. Conclusions
This paper investigates  the effect of developing-country,  debt-reduction endeavors on the
market  value of two major creditor group: U.S. and Japanese banks.  Our estimates  of abnormal
returns indicate that stock price reaction of different groups of banks to our focal events varied widely.
U.S. multinationals showed the strongest reaction among all banks to the Brady announcement and
the Mexican agreement.  U.S. non-multinationals do not appear to be significantly affected by this
paper's international-debt related events.
The Japanese  experience was quite different from that  of the  U.S. banks.  The reaction
experienced  by all three groups of Japanese banks was much weaker than that of U.S. multinationals.
Long-Term  Credit Banks and Trust Banks appear to be the bank groups that  show responsiveness to
our focal  events. Bank of Tokyo had the highest LDC-debt  exposure among Japanese banks it showed
no reaction to our focal events. The Brady announcement and the initial Mexican announcement have
a negative effect on Japanese bank stock returns. We interpret this to be a reflection of the negative
expectations that a U.S.-initiated debt-reduction strategy would  not be favorable for Japanese banks.
Indeed, it is only after the menu choices are announced, the market recognizes that  the Japanese
banks were treated fairly and corrects itself.
Our cross-sectional analysis first shows that market reactions experienced by banks were not
necessarily proportional to their exposure levels.  This constitutes evidence  that the impact of our focal
events was different per unit of exposure across our sample banks which is consistent with James'
(1990) heterogenous-creditor hypothesis for U.S. banks.  Second, we failed to find any differential
reactioi. :;o  'banks mrking diferent  menu choices. This may constitute evidence that  creditor banks
were able to negotiate the menu choices in according  to their best interests. Also, the menu choices
were optimal and consistent with each bank's business objectives.19
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Table  I
Exposure  Levels  and  Menu Choices in  1989 Mexico Agreements  of sample  banks
Choices  are in US currency.  All facilities chosen in other currency are converted to US Dollar using
the exchange rate at the end of 1989. The options are New money facilities (NM), Par bonds (DSRB)
and Discount bonds (DRB). Exposure is the percentage of common  equity that equals the outstanding
loans.
U.S. Multinational  Banks
1.  BankAmerica Corp  869  0  100  30.58  56.06  263.2  482.5
2.  Bankers  Trust NY  771  259  0  33.40  41.22  114.3  141.0
3.  Chase Manhattan  833  346  0  27.85  64.41  189.9  418.8
4.  Chemical Bank  939  309  0  35.66  81.98  192.3  442.0
5.  CitiCorp  6  5  394  16.11  21.41  166.3  220.9
6.  Continental  Bank Corp  178  0  9  13.36  31.00  198.1  459.7
7.  First  Chicago  387  0  0  16.32  24.34  107.7  160.7
8.  Manufacturers  Hanover  662  639  9  51.70  133.82  288.8  747.6
9.  J.P. Morgan  Co.  264  265  0  11.64  10.45  83.1  74.6
10.Security Pacific  1  15  0  6.49  6.55  23.8  40.6
Average  24.31  47.12  162.75  318.84
U.S. Non-Multinational  Banka
1.  Bank of New York  0  209  0  11.53  28.87  95.9  240.2
2.  First Fidelity  Corp  36  29  0  5.35  4.47  11.7  9.8
3.  First  Pennsylvania  Corp  78  0  0  22.21  19.74  141.0  125.3
4.  Manufacturers  National  0.5  0  0  0.09  0.08  27.2  24.7
5.  Mellon Bank Corp  215  0  0  17.85  27.37  165.9  254.4
6.  Midlantic Corp  0  19  0  2.19  1.94  6.7  5.9
7.  National  City Corp  82  0  0  6.19  4.40  14.1  10.0
8.  Republic NY Corp  31  39  2  6.89  7.46  39.0  42.2
9.  Southeast  Banking  Corp  0  32  0  6.49  6.55  33.2  33.5
10. Wells Fargo & Co  33  11  0  1.94  1.66  21.0  17.9
Average  8.07  10.25  55.57  76.3922
...  . ...  . ..... RIt  ~  *  ~v
Japanese  Banks
Long  term  Credit  Banks
1.  Industrial  Bank of Japan  0  378  0  6.70  0.78  22.76  2.67
2.  Long-Terrm  Credit Bank of Japan  1  366  0  11.14  1.65  42.82  6.33
3.  Nippon Cre<dit  Bank  0  276  0  14.53  2.35  44.69  7.25
Average  10.79  1.59  36.76  5.42
City Banks
4.  Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank  284  523  0  10.89  1.60  25.65  3.76
5.  Hokkaido Takushoku  Bank  0  217  0  18.98  4.47  44.64  10.50
6.  Bank of Tokyo  326  761  0  29.38  6.08  98.40  20.37
7.  Mitsui Bank  31  292  0  8.34  1.57  25.44  4.78
8.  Mitsubishi  Bank  186  434  0  8.34  1.42  26.09  4.28
9.  Fuji  Bank  190  344  0  6.50  1.08  22.51  3.73
lO.Sumitomo Bank  168  703  0  11.64  1.80  26.79  4.13
11.Daiwa Bank  6  211  4  11.36  2.01  22.98  4.06
12.Sanwa Bank  174  414  0  9.25  1.60  27.00  4.65
13.Tokai Bank  195  455  0  15.96  2.75  40.44  6.96
14.Kyowa Bank  0  214  0  12.07  2.92  25.29  6.12
15.Saitama  Bank  9  188  0  11.39  2.69  28.80  6.81
Average  12.84  2.50  J 34.42  6.68
Trust Banks
16.Mitsui  Trust  & Bank  41  192  0  10.37  1.87  33.19  5.98
17.Mitsubishi  Trust  & Bank  87  202  0  7.65  1.55  19.07  3.85
18.Sumitomo Trust  & Bank  0  161  0  4.89  0.98  18.53  3.73
19.Yasuda Trust  & Bank  0  194  0  9.49  2.35  34.73  8.60
20.Nippon Trust  Bank  0  8  0  2.82  0.47  12.73  2.14
21.Toyo Trust  & Banking  14  91  0  7.02  1.35  23.27  4.48
Average  7.04  1.43  23.59  4.8023
N  Table  II
Abnormal Returns  of US.  Sample Banks  in the vicinity  of the Brady Announcement
go  =  al  + PjRj  + yiD, + et
Si, =  at + PDR.,  + A,D,EX,  + e,
For multinational banks the return series cover period 12/28/88  through 416/89.  For non-multinational  banks the period covered  is 12/28/88 through 1126/89. The entries corresponding  to Hl, H2 and H3 are the F-statistics of the hypotheses tested. Hl is the hypothesis that  the y of each bank is equals to zero on the event day.  H2 is the hypothesis that the y are equal across all banks on the event day.  H3 is the hypothesis that the X  re equal across all banks on the event day.
Panel  A.:  Multinational  Banks
r=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  .4  ai
1  0.21  1.33  -0.57  -0.75  0.64  1.57  4.43**  0.92  1.18  1.91  0.006  0.016**
2  0.05  0.91  0.08  0.35  041  3.14*  3.66*  -05.2  0.93  -1.34  0.027*  0.033**
3  0.26  0.95  1.80  0.19  -0.10  0.83  2.65**  0.06  0.21  -0.39  0.004  0.014*
4  0.10  0.53  -0.16  1.21  1.45  3.32**  5.31**  -1.75  0.51  0.16  0.016'*  0.029*"
5  0.03  1.18  2.68  1.53  -1.15  5.21-**  4.49"*  -1.33  0.98  -1.06  0.030***  0.028*w
6  -0.09  0.98  -0.07  0.21  1.92  5.69***  0.90  .0S6  0.43  -1.03  0.028***  0.004
7  0.25  1.08  0.52  -0.53  0.86  0.99  5.62*4*  0.24  -0.91  -2.20*.  0.008  0.053 w
8  0.21  0.85  -0.37  -0.52  0.40  5.19"*  2.67  -2.22  0.28  0.67  0.018***  0.010*
9  0.02  0.91  0.17  0.55  1.60  3.87***  -. 20***  0.05  0.38  -1.68  0.045**  0.063***
10  O.C4  1.18  0.64  -1.25  0.33  2.37$  1.73  1.14  4-.36  -0.43  0.098w*  0.063
Average  0.47  0.10  0.64  3.21  3.67  .0.39  0.36  -0.54  0.03  0.03
|  Hi  l  l  |  1.04  0.69  0.91  4.23¢**  3.2r**  1.06  0.33  1.11
H2  1.11  0.57  0.96f  4.34***  1.66*  0.96  0.36  1.17




significant  at  10 percent.  significant  at  5 percent.  *  significant  at  I percent.24
Table  H
Panel  B: Non-multinational  Banks
1  -0.04  1.48  0.50  1.26  0.50  0.50  1.86  -4A8  -0.37  1.36
2  -0.15  1.74  0.07  -0.20  0.09  -1.08  -0.01  -0.28  -1.12  0.33
3  0.05  0.78  -1.25  -0.02  -0.27  0.58  0.05  0.54  -0.26  0.04
4  0.05  0.55  0.35  0.53  0.35  -0.85  -0.41  0.35  -0.76  0.28
5  -0.02  1.33  0.57  -0.37  0.57  1.22  -0.38  0.56  0.11  0.16
6  -0.09  0.93  -0.49  -0.19  0.14  -0.66  -0.91  -0.22  0.16  -0.15
7  0.04  0.65  0.54  -0.39  -0.99  0.04  -0.34  -0.74  -0.22  -0.37
8  -0.00  0.68  0.09  0.03  -0.46  0.25  0.66  -0.33  -0.19  -0.77
9  -0.01  0.89  -0.74  0.04  1.23  -0.41  -0.83  -0.38  -0.12  -1.47
10  0.03  1.23  0.79  -0.35  0.03  1.88**  1.36  0.94  -0.37  -0.25
Average  0.04  0.03  0.12  0.15  0.11  -0.00  . -0.31  -0.08
Hi  0.33  0.26  0.30  0.91  0.80  0.28  0.22  0.41
**  significant at 5 percent.25
Table  m
Abnormal  Returns  of  U.S. Banks  on Significant  Days Relating  to the  Mexico Agreement
RI,=  a,  +  PRt+  y1D, + elt
For multinational banks the abnormal  returns for the Mexico  Announcement  are estimn'ed  covering period from 12128/88
through 4/6/89.  Others  are estimated  using  period from 4/7/89 through  11/22/89. For non-multinational  banks  all events are
estimates  using  sample period from  12128/88  through  11/26/89.
The entries  correspond to Hi  and H2 are the F-statistics  of the hypotheses tested.  Hi  is the hypothesis  that  the  abnormal
return  of each bank equals to zero at the event day. H2 is the hypothesis that  the abnormal returns  are equal  across all banks
at the event day.
|Pmel  As MuInAtIonal 
I  -0no1  a26  2.66  3.60*-
2  -004  2.15  6.47w  1.17
X  ~  ~  ~  .00  1.9 S  409  1.97  3.77**m  1.92 
4 .0.14  2.21  6.24-*  2.08*
5  _0.ll  3.06  3.67"  2.26
a  -0.08  .09  4.69  0.41
7  .0Q07  1.77  1.19  0.62
8  Q0,06  1.69  4.38"*0  1.I
9  -0.00  1.66  2.73"  0.68
10  4.06  1.87  0.37  1_6a  _
Ave-ag  3.40  1.66
Hl  3.68"s  0.83
H2  2.85'S
Panel  Di Non-iunatlonal  Danka
1  .0.04  1.48  0.72  0.39
2  -0.15  1.74  1.62  0.86
3  0.06  0.78  0.98  466
4  0.05  0.66  *0.02  .0.07
5  -0.02  1.33  0.65  0.83
6  -0.09  0.93  1.16  0.17
7  0.04  0.66  2.38  0.23
8  .0.00  0.68  0.38  1.06
9  .0.01  0.89  0.08  .1.01
10  0.03  1.23  1.74*  0.31
Averae  0.96  0.21
Hi  1.13  0.37
dudnflcant at 10 percent  uignificant at 5 pereent.  s  ugnifcant  at I percnt.26
Table  IV
Abnormal  Returns  of Japanese  Banks  in the  vicinity  of the  Brady  Announcement
A  =  at  + PIRr  + yiD  +  e 6 t
t  =  +  PIRt  +  . DtX,  +.eD  *
Weekly  data are used to estimate the parameters with sample period  covering  the whole 1989. The entries corresponding  to
Hl, H2 and H3 are the F-statistics of the hypotheses  tested. Hi is the hypothesis  that the y of each bank equals to zer  on the
event week. H2 is the hypothesis  that the y are equal across all banks on the event week. H3 is the hypothesis  that the X are
equal across all banks on the event week.
Longterm C  Bdank
1  0.46  0.67  1.31  6.92*  0Q058  .0.200  1.07  0.48
2  0.00  0.97  4.78  .6.63'  0.112  416560  2.96  *1.33
3  0.32  0.66  2.03  .0.86  0.046  0.019  0.10  . 3.08
Aveg  1386  447  004  .0.14  .1.31  0.42
City  Bank
4  -0.44  0.77  -1.45  0.76  .0.066  0.030  0.64  1.08
5  6  0.61  0.49  0.41  -1.43  0.009  .0.032  .63  2.06
6  0.14  0.22  0.42  0.45  0.004  0.006  -0.27  0.97
7  0.09  0.26  0.37  4.78  .0.016  .0.031  0.22  6.19-
a  .0.42  0.68  0.84  .0.04  0.033  0.000  0.07  0.83
9  .0-2  0.46  0.96  .1.32  0.042  .0.069  .0.81  2.09
10  .0.34  0.71  3.97  1  .38  0.148  0.062  .Z56  3.48
it  0.04  0.30  1.81  406"*  0.079  -0.204"  .. 25  2.86
12  -0.58  1.14  -3.32  2.63  -0.123  0.094  -0.41  1.64
13  -0.21  0Q7  0.46  223  40011  0.066  3.24--  3.06"
14  0.24  0.42  0.93  1  .45  0.057  .0.181'  0.34  - 3.23
16  0.14  0.33  .0.11  1.16  .0.004  0.040  .2.87  2.29
Averge  0.30  |  40  0.01  4  Q.02  1.44  1.6 
Trumt  Banks 
16  .0.63  0.91  ..14  J  .4.47  40.66  0.135  0.63  1.77
17  .0.50  0.74  .072  4.64  .0.038  .0.191  -2.86  4.73
18  -0.79  126  .1.34  -1.86  -0.072  .0.100  -1.40  5.26
19  .0.37  1.06  -2.08  .5.70"O  .0.060  .0.164"'  0.91  3.20
20  0.16  1.01  6.396  -2.32  -. 046  .0182  3.06  5.60
21  -0.49  0.88  .1.88  .Z76  .0.081  .0.119  4.77"0  3.78
Av-p  .2.52  .3.46  .0.14  .0.16  .1.59  4.04
HI  2.44"*'  4.24**  J  1.76"  2.965"
H2  2.568"  4.24"|  1.79"  2.66"'
H3  [  2.371"'  4.419"1
*igeflcant  at 10 percent.  ai  gnipinant at 5 pernt.  "'  4difcant  at I pereenLPolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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